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N two excellent contributions to this symposium, Alan Gunn and El-
len Aprill consider the merits of moving tax anti-avoidance doctrines
from the judicial realm into some codified form (statutory or regula-
tory).' They have different views of the primary purpose of codification.
To Gunn, the purpose is to introduce a new anti-avoidance doctrine, not
to be found in the existing judge-made law.2 To Aprill, the purpose is to
shift from the courts to the IRS the discretionary power to identify tax
avoidance transactions. 3 Codification of a general anti-avoidance rule
(GAAR) is currently on the policy agenda because it is a central feature
of the Treasury Department's anti-corporate tax shelter proposals. 4
Oddly enough, however, the Treasury proposal is clearly not designed to
accomplish either the purpose identified by Gunn or the purpose identi-
fied by Aprill.5 All this suggests that there is considerable confusion as to
what is at stake in the debate over the Treasury proposal. The first part
of this comment examines the purposes suggested by Gunn and Aprill for
a GAAR, and other possible purposes more congruent with the design of
the Treasury proposal. The conclusion is that, although a GAAR could
affect judicial outcomes in some cases, it is easy to overstate its signifi-
cance. It would probably not change judicial outcomes in most cases, and
it could not possibly put an end to the proliferation of corporate tax shel-
ters. The second part of this comment considers other reforms which
might be more significant than a codified GAAR in controlling corporate
tax shelters. It suggests that two approaches worthy of serious considera-
tion are imposing criminal penalties on corporate officers who fail to
comply with tax shelter disclosure requirements and enacting a corporate
* Reef C. Ivey, II Professor of Law, University of North Carolina.
1. See Alan Gunn, The Use and Misuse of Antiabuse Rules: Lessons From the Part-
nership Antiabuse Regulations, 54 SMU L. REV. 159 (2001); Ellen P. Aprill, Tax Shelters,
Tax Law, and Morality: Codifying Judicial Doctrines, 54 SMU L. REv. 9 (2001).
2. See Gunn, supra note 1, at 159.
3. See Aprill, supra note 1, at 18-19.
4. See DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINIS-
TRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS 126 (Feb. 2000) [hereinafter 2001
REVENUE PROPOSALS]; DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY, THE PROBLEM OF CORPORATE
TAX SHELTERS: DISCUSSION, ANALYSIS AND LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS 103-05 (July 1999)
[hereinafter WHITE PAPER].
5. See 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 126.
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tax schedular system analogous to the passive loss rules applicable to in-
dividual taxpayers.
I. POSSIBLE REASONS TO CODIFY ANTI-
AVOIDANCE DOCTRINES
A. BECAUSE "ABUSE" IS A NEW CONCEPT
According to Alan Gunn, the partnership anti-abuse regulations 6 go
beyond the established judicial anti-avoidance doctrines by introducing
the idea of "abuse:"
A transaction can be abusive without running afoul of any of the
traditional anti-avoidance doctrines; that is, it can have a business
purpose and [economic] substance, its substance and form can coin-
cide, and yet it yields a tax result that no sensible legislator would
have approved of if the transaction had been called to the legislator's
attention when the statute was drafted. Flawed though they may be,
the section 701 regulations give us a useful concept of "abuse," dis-
tinct from other anti-avoidance doctrines.7
Although Gunn does not discuss the current concern with curbing cor-
porate tax shelters, presumably he would think the legislative enactment
of a GAAR would appropriately extend the concept of abuse beyond the
partnership context. I agree with Gunn that the concept he has identified
is useful; the fact that a transaction is abusive in the sense described by
Gunn should be reason enough for a court to refuse to allow tax benefits.
In fact, Gunn deserves more credit than the drafters of the partnership
regulations for clearly identifying the abuse concept. Although the regu-
lations are titled "Anti-abuse rule," neither "abuse" nor "abusive" ap-
pears anywhere in the text of the regulations.8 The preamble to the
regulations, far from claiming any innovation, states that "the fundamen-
tal principles reflected in the regulation are consistent with the estab-
lished legal doctrines." 9
Despite my agreement with Gunn about the usefulness of the abuse
concept, and my appreciation for the quality of his discussion of the con-
cept, I do not think that the concept plays an important role in the cur-
rent debate over the Treasury proposal. Whatever may be at stake in the
GAAR fight, the issue does not seem to be the codification of abuse as a
new and distinct anti-avoidance doctrine. The Treasury proposal applies
only to a transaction which both (a) seeks to obtain a tax benefit not
"clearly contemplated" by the applicable Code provision, and (b) lacks
economic substance (in the sense that the reasonably expected pre-tax
profit is insignificant relative to the reasonably expected net tax bene-
6. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2 (as amended in 1995).
7. Gunn, supra note 1, at 160 (emphasis added).
8. Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2.
9. T.D. 8588, 1995-1 C.B. 109, 112 (emphasis added). The preamble goes on to ex-
plain that any "uncertainty regarding the application of the regulation reflects the uncer-
tainty that already exists in properly evaluating transactions under current law, including
the proper application of existing legal doctrines." Id.
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fits).10 By contrast, a proposal intended to codify the abuse concept
would consist of a narrower version of the first requirement (roughly
speaking, the proposal would apply only to those tax benefits clearly not
contemplated by the statute, rather than to all tax benefits not clearly
contemplated), and nothing else. There would be no additional require-
ment that a transaction lack economic substance in order to be subject to
the rule. None of this is to say that codification of Gunn's concept of
abuse would be a bad idea; the point is simply that the Treasury proposal
makes no attempt to codify that concept, so the fight over the proposal
must be about something else.
I would also suggest, more speculatively, that Gunn may have over-
stated the difference between his concept of abusive transactions and the
current state of judicial anti-avoidance doctrines. My interpretation is
that the courts are working toward a concept very much like Gunn's,
even without specific regulatory or statutory direction, and are likely to
arrive there fairly soon. In support of that view, I offer the Third Cir-
cuit's opinion in ACM Partnership v. Commissioner." In ACM, Colgate
wanted a tax shelter for about $100 million of capital gain, which it real-
ized on the sale of a subsidiary. It entered into an investment partnership
with a foreign taxpayer. The partnership purchased private placement
notes (the Citicorp notes) and sold them a few weeks later for $140 mil-
lion cash and about $34 million of contingent payment installment notes
(the LIBOR notes). The installment method regulations then in effect
for contingent payment sales provided for allocating basis recovery
evenly over the six years that payments were to be made on the notes.' 2
Thus, the cash down payment was allocated only one-sixth of the basis
despite representing over eighty percent of the amount realized. The re-
sult was a large artificial capital gain in the year of sale and corresponding
artificial capital losses in later years. The capital gain was allocated to the
tax-indifferent foreign partner and the capital losses in later years were
allocated to Colgate (and carried back to the year with the large capital
gain). The Third Circuit disallowed Colgate's claimed capital losses on
the grounds that they lacked economic substance. 13
Both the Citicorp notes and the LIBOR notes were genuine invest-
ments of capital and paid real economic returns in the form of interest.
In addition, in the case of the Citicorp notes the yield was at the market
rate. How, then, could the Third Circuit conclude there was no economic
substance to the deal? It did so by applying a present value analysis
under which the Citicorp notes bearing a market rate of return were con-
sidered an "economically inconsequential" no-profit investment.' 4 The
LIBOR notes, with an expected return below the market rate, were even
10. 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 124, 126.
11. 157 F.3d 231 (3d Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 526 U.S. 1017 (1999).
12. See Treas. Reg. § 15(a).453-1(c)(3), 46 Fed. Reg. 10714 (Feb. 4, 1981).
13. ACM, 157 F.3d at 263.
14. Id. at 257.
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worse; the court labeled them "economically disadvantageous. '15
If we take the court at its word, the surprising result is that only invest-
ments with expected returns above the market rate of return have eco-
nomic substance; any investment merely at the going rate is
inconsequential and can be disregarded when necessary to deny inappro-
priate tax benefits. I read ACM as a sub silentio adoption of Gunn's
concept of abuse as an independent anti-avoidance doctrine. If investing
at the going rate of return can lack economic substance, then the eco-
nomic substance requirement itself lacks substance. A creative court,
faced with a transaction intended to achieve "a tax result that no sensible
legislator would have approved of,"'1 6 will boldly declare the transaction
lacks economic substance, no matter how much substance the transaction
actually possesses. Eventually, courts will acknowledge that the eco-
nomic substance analysis has become fictional, and abandon it in favor of
a straightforward application of Gunn's approach.
My reading of ACM, however, is at odds with David Hariton's inter-
pretation. 17 Far from seeing ACM as the beginning of the end for the
requirement that a transaction lack economic substance in order to be
subject to judicial anti-avoidance doctrines, Hariton believes ACM repre-
sents a principled development of the economic substance test.18 Ac-
cording to Hariton, the economic substance doctrine disallows tax
benefits of a transaction only if "the formalistic results are ... disturbing
enough to be overturned," and the transaction lacks economic sub-
stance. 19 Although Hariton acknowledges that most cases in which
courts found insufficient economic substance involved debt-financed in-
vestments with little or no profit potential, he defines economic substance
not with reference to profit potential but with reference to whether the
transaction has meaningfully altered the taxpayer's economic position
(apart from taxes).20 Thus, "[A] complicated way of investing cash lacks
economic substance-even though it obviously produces a profit-if it
leaves the taxpayer in substantially the same position as if the cash had
been left in the bank."2'
Hariton, then, does not see ACM as an unacknowledged shift from the
economic substance doctrine to an anti-abuse rule, which can apply even
when a transaction has economic substance. To the contrary, he describes
the judicial anti-avoidance doctrine as "permit[ting] taxpayers to retain
even the most egregious tax benefits if they arise from transactions with
meaningful economic consequences. 112 I disagree, but our disagreement
15. Id.
16. Gunn, supra note 1, at 160.
17. See David P. Hariton, Sorting Out the Tangle of Economic Substance, 52 TAx LAw.
235 (1999).
18. See id. at 248-49, 262-68.
19. Id. at 235.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 235-36.
22. Id. at 235.
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is really about what the courts are likely to do next, so only time will tell
who is correct. What follows are the reasons for my prediction that the
courts will first fictionalize, and eventually abandon, the economic sub-
stance test.
Until the recent spate of corporate tax shelters, abusive transactions
overwhelmingly took the form of debt-financed investments.23 A court
could hold that a transaction lacked economic substance because it had
little or no potential for profit, after taking into account the required in-
terest payments on the debt. Tax practitioners and scholars generally be-
lieved that tax benefits would not be disallowed under the economic
substance doctrine if a transaction had a significant potential for profit.2 4
An innovative aspect of recent corporate tax shelters is that many of
them-including the ACM transaction-are equity-financed and thus can
easily produce a significant pre-tax profit. There was good reason, then,
before the ACM opinion, to think that such shelters would survive an IRS
challenge based on the economic substance doctrine. In support of the
court's innovative interpretation of the doctrine in ACM, Hariton would
argue that an equity investment in a tax shelter is equivalent to borrowing
from oneself at a rate of interest equal to the return one would have
earned on the alternative investment.25 If borrowing from someone else
at the market interest rate to invest at the market rate lacks substance (in
the case of the traditional shelter), then borrowing from oneself at the
market rate to invest at the market rate should also lack substance (in the
case of the new corporate shelters).26 Under this view, ACM can be in-
terpreted not as a silent abandonment of the economic substance test but
as a principled extension of the test to the new generation of equity-fi-
nanced tax shelters. Courts will continue to require an absence of eco-
nomic substance as a condition of disallowing tax shelter benefits, with
the proviso that an equity investment at the market rate of return lacks
economic substance.
Time may prove Hariton right, but I suspect courts will not stop where
they are. It is one thing for a court in a traditional tax shelter case to hold
that borrowing $100 at 10% in order to invest $100 at 10% in an identical
debt instrument is a pointless exercise, which no one would engage in but
for the hope of tax benefits. It is quite another thing for a court to hold in
an equity shelter case that investing $100 of one's own money at 10% (the
market interest rate) is a pointless exercise, which no one would engage
in but for the hope of tax benefits. The difference, quite simply, is that
the first statement is true and the second one is false. Hariton would
respond that I have misstated the economic substance analysis for equity
23. See, e.g., Knetsch v. United States, 364 U.S. 361 (1960); Goldstein v. Comm'r, 364
F.2d 734 (2d Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1005 (1967).
24. See, e.g., Alvin C. Warren, Jr., The Requirement of Economic Profit in Tax Moti-
vated Transactions, 59 TAXES 985 (1981), cited to this effect by Hariton, supra note 17, at
249 n.42.
25. See Hariton, supra note 17, at 249.
26. See id.
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shelters. What is pointless (apart from taxes) is investing $100 in the shel-
ter rather than in a non-shelter with the same pre-tax rate of return. But
that is considerably less compelling than the pointlessness analysis of
debt-financed shelters. The analysis for debt-financed shelters appeals to
actual borrowing, whereas the analysis for equity shelters appeals to hy-
pothetical alternative investments. The equity tax shelter analysis de-
pends on debatable assumptions about what the taxpayer would have
done with its money had it not invested in the shelter. Hariton suggests
an investment can lack economic substance if it produces non-tax results
no different from "if the cash had been left in the bank. '27 But how do
we know the taxpayer would have kept the cash in the bank, but for the
shelter? Even if there is no economic substance in investing cash in a tax
shelter debt instrument paying a market rate of return when the alterna-
tive use of the money would have been an investment in a non-shelter
debt instrument bearing the same (or higher) rate of return, there is cer-
tainly economic substance to the same tax shelter investment if the alter-
native use would have been the drilling of wildcat oil wells. Since the
taxpayer, in fact, invested in the equity shelter, we can never know what
it otherwise would have done with its money, and thus we can never tell
whether the shelter had economic substance.28
In light of these difficulties with the idea that an investment at a market
rate of return lacks economic substance, I suspect the courts will not find
the current state of the law to be a convenient place to rest. Rather, they
are likely to continue to undermine-and eventually abandon-absence
of economic substance as a requirement for disallowing tax benefits from
an abusive transaction. The closer the courts are to reaching that point,
the less difference it makes whether Congress codifies Gunn's concept of
an abusive transaction. In fact, enactment of the Treasury proposal might
act as a brake on judicial abandonment of the economic substance test,
since the proposal appears to be take the test more seriously than does
the Third Circuit in ACM.29
27. Id. at 235-36.
28. How the money was invested before the taxpayer purchased the shelter is not
necessarily how the money would have been invested in the absence of the shelter, despite
the Third Circuit's reliance on that factor in ACM. See ACM, 157 F.3d at 249.
29. The Treasury proposal bears a superficial similarity to ACM, since both call for
present value analyses. The nature of the analyses are quite different, however. Under the
Treasury proposal, economic substance would be absent if the present value of the reason-
ably expected pre-tax profit was insignificant in relation to the present value of the reason-
ably expected net tax benefits. 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 126. ACM, by
contrast, views an investment as lacking economic substance if it does not have an ex-
pected pre-tax return higher than the discount rate. ACM, 157 F.3d at 257-60. Suppose,
for example, the discount rate is 10% and the taxpayer invests $100 in a debt instrument
paying $10 annual interest until maturity at the end of 10 years. Under the Treasury pro-
posal, the present value of the reasonably expected pre-tax profit ($10 per year for 10
years) is a little more than $61; whether the investment had economic substance would
depend on how $61 compared to the present value of the anticipated tax benefits. Under
ACM, the fact that the investment does not have an expected return above the discount
rate is the end of the economic substance portion of the analysis; the investment lacks
economic substance.
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B. BECAUSE IT WILL GIVE THE IRS MORE DISCRETION
In her contribution to this symposium, Ellen Aprill suggests that what
is really at stake in the codification debate is the allocation of authority
between the courts and the IRS. With judicial doctrines, the discretion to
decide when the justification underlying a statutory rule should "trump
the language of [the] rule" lies with the court.30 Aprill states, however,
that "[c]odifying these judicial doctrines would empower administrative
agents to decide themselves whether to follow the rule or to resort to its
justification."' 31 Regulatory and statutory anti-avoidance rules certainly
can include grants of discretion to the IRS to determine when the rules
apply. Both the partnership anti-abuse regulations and the President's
Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal took this approach.32 This approach
results in a significant transfer of authority from the courts to the IRS,
because a court would be obligated to uphold the IRS' application of the
anti-avoidance rule to a particular taxpayer as long as the IRS did not
abuse its discretion, even if the court would otherwise have concluded the
rule did not apply.33 It is important to note, however, that this transfer of
authority would accomplish little in terms of deterring corporate tax shel-
ter activity. A typical corporation entering into a shelter does so in the
hope that the shelter will escape IRS detection, not in the hope that the
shelter will be upheld in court.34 The transfer of discretion to the IRS
would do nothing to increase the chances of shelter detection, and so
would have little deterrent effect.
Aprill offers a thoughtful discussion of the advantages and disadvan-
tages of such of shift of authority. Oversimplifying her nuanced analysis,
the basic objection to the shift is that practitioners reasonably fear that
the IRS-unlike the courts-will exercise its discretion with a systematic
anti-taxpayer bias. 35 The responses to that objection are that the IRS has
30. Aprill, supra note 1, at 18.
31. Id. at 20.
32. According to Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b), "[t]he Commissioner can recast the transac-
tion for federal tax purposes, as appropriate to achieve tax results that are consistent with
the intent of subchapter K .... . The Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal would have
granted to the Secretary of the Treasury the authority to disallow a deduction, credit, ex-
clusion, or other tax benefit obtained in a tax avoidance transaction. DEPARTMENT OF THE
TREASURY, GENERAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE ADMINISTRATION'S FISCAL YEAR 2000 REv-
ENUE PROPOSALS 95-96 (February 1999).
33. See, e.g., Lucas v. Am. Code Co., 280 U.S. 445, 449 (1930) (stating that predecessor
of I.R.C. § 446(b) conferred on the tax administrator "[m]uch latitude for discretion" in
determining whether the taxpayer's accounting method clearly reflected income).
34. See Joseph Bankman, The New Market in Corporate Tax Shelters, 83 TAX NOTES
1775, 1776 (1999) ("Once the odds of audit are factored in, however, the cost benefit analy-
sis leans decidedly in favor of the new corporate tax shelters.").
35. See Aprill, supra note 1, at 22. An anti-taxpayer bias would be in conflict with the
IRS' "Statement of Principles of Internal Revenue Tax Administration," reprinted at the
beginning of every cumulative bulletin, which declares, "[i]t is the responsibility of each
person in the Service, charged with the duty of interpreting the law, to try to find the true
meaning of the statutory provision and not to adopt a strained construction in the belief
that he or she is 'protecting the revenue."' 1999-2 C.B. ii. Practitioners may be forgiven,
however, if they are not convinced that every IRS employee has taken that admonition to
heart.
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a good track record of responsibly exercising similar grants of discre-
tion,36 and that even if there is some bias in the IRS' exercise of discre-
tion this may be an appropriate counterbalance to the de facto discretion
granted (by reason of the audit lottery) to tax lawyers subject to a pro-
taxpayer bias.
The question of how much discretion the IRS should have in the appli-
cation of a GAAR is interesting and important, but disagreement on that
question cannot explain the current debate over the desirability of a stat-
utory GAAR. When practitioner groups objected to the grant of discre-
tion to the IRS in the Fiscal Year 2000 Budget Proposal, 37 the Treasury
quickly announced (in a WHITE PAPER issued on July 1, 1999) a change in
its position. It continued to support codification of the economic sub-
stance doctrine, but under its new position "the tax attribute disallowance
rule would apply by operation of law, rather than being subject to the
discretion of the Secretary. ' 38 Considering the general prolixity of the
WHITE PAPER, its discussion of the about-face on the discretion issue is
remarkably brief and conclusory. "[T]o address legitimate concerns re-
garding... the potential abuse of discretion," states the WHITE PAPER, a
"self-executing" GAAR should be enacted, rather than the previously
proposed grant of administrative discretion.39 Beyond acknowledging
the legitimacy of practitioners' concerns and noting the practical differ-
ence between the two approaches in terms of the degree of judicial defer-
ence afforded the IRS, the WHITE PAPER offers no discussion of the
relative merits of the two approaches. In short, although the Treasury
stuck to its guns (in the face of considerable practitioner opposition) in its
support of a statutory GAAR, it gave up on the discretion issue without a
fight.
As the Treasury's revised proposal demonstrates, a shift of power from
the courts to the IRS is not a necessary element of a statutory GAAR.40
Codification (either statutory or regulatory) of anti-avoidance doctrines
may be necessary to accomplish a transfer of discretion from the courts to
the IRS, but such a transfer is not a necessary element of codification, 41
36. See Aprill, supra note 1, at 22-23. The two major examples discussed by Aprill are
the discretion granted by I.R.C. § 482 to allocate income and deduction items among re-
lated taxpayers, and the discretion the IRS has in deciding when the requirements of the
tax-free corporate reorganization provisions have been satisfied.
37. For an excellent summary of the nature of the objections, see Peter C. Canellos, A
Tax Practitioner's Perspective on Substance, Form and Business Purpose in Structuring Bus-
iness Transactions and in Tax Shelters, 54 SMU L. REV. 47 (2001). See also WHrrE PAPER,
supra note 4, at 102 (summarizing objections).
38. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at xix.
39. Id. at 103-04.
40. 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 126.
41. There is a faint suggestion in Aprill's article that a codified GAAR necessarily
involves a grant of discretion to the IRS, even if the statute makes no mention of the fact.
In her discussion of the dangers of IRS discretion, she cites comments of a practitioner
group on the President's Fiscal Year 2001 Budget Proposal (which proposed a self-execut-
ing GAAR, without any explicit grant of discretion to the IRS), that "even a substantive
disallowance rule ... has the potential for being misunderstood and misapplied" by IRS
employees. Aprill, supra note 1, at 15 (quoting New York State Bar Association Tax Sec-
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and the current Treasury proposal does not call for any transfer. Thus the
puzzle remains. If a codified GAAR is not about Gunn's concept of abu-
sive transactions and if it is not about granting discretion to the IRS, what
is the point? Answers to this question have been suggested; they are dis-
cussed below.
C. CODIFYING THE BEST OF THE CASE LAW
One advantage claimed by the WHITE PAPER for codification is that a
statutory GAAR can adopt the best of the anti-avoidance case law.
Under current law, according to the WHITE PAPER, "[s]elf-assessment is
frustrated by conflicting, incoherent decisions and encourages the most
aggressive taxpayers to pick and choose among the most favorable
cases."' 42 To a limited extent, the WHITE PAPER even names names, citing
a Supreme Court opinion as an example of the "less developed, inconsis-
tent decisions" to be rejected by codification. 43 It would be possible to
write a GAAR which clearly rejects the reasoning of certain disfavored
cases, 44 and it would even be possible to mention disfavored cases by
name in the legislative history. There is some merit to this justification
for a GAAR, but the Treasury overstates the probable significance and
disregards the danger of unintended consequences.
The probable significance is overstated because the codified GAAR
will still be a more-or-less vague standard (rather than a precise rule),
with great latitude for judicial interpretation. Just as aggressive taxpayers
can now pick and choose among uneven judicial interpretations of ex-
isting anti-avoidance doctrines, under codification taxpayers would be
able to choose among the inevitable conflicting interpretations of the
GAAR.45 Depending on the details of the statutory language and the
tion, Report on the Treasury's Proposal to Codify Economic Substance Doctrine, 2000 TAX
NOTES TODAY 146-25, at n.3 (July 28, 2000)). If the implication is that even a self-execut-
ing GAAR involves a special (albeit unstated) grant of discretion to the IRS, I disagree.
The potential for IRS agents to misunderstand and misapply case law would seem to be at
least as great as the potential to bungle a statutory GAAR. In any event, misunderstand-
ing and misapplying the law is not what is ordinarily meant by the exercise of discretion.
42. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 99.
43. Id. at 100 (citing Frank Lyon Co. v. United States, 435 U.S. 561 (1978)).
44. Obviously, a GAAR can be drafted with much more detailed provisions than
those of the Treasury proposal. For an example, see H.R. 2255, 106th Cong. (1999).
Dana Trier has suggested that one benefit of codification would be the rejection of indi-
cations in some cases that the presence a subjective business purpose can serve to legiti-
mate a tax shelter transaction, even when objective economic substance is lacking. Dana
L. Trier, Beyond the Smell Test: The Role of Substantive Anti-Avoidance Rules in Address-
ing the Corporate Tax Shelter Problem, TAXES, March 2000, at 62, 83. Trier cites in the Tax
Court's recent opinion in Saba Partnership v. Commissioner, 78 T.C.M. (CCH) 684 (1999),
as an example of the approach which could be rejected by codification. I agree that this
sort of tidying up of the common law is a potential benefit of codification, but the benefit
will surely be of minor significance. It is not likely that, in the absence of statutory clean
up, many courts would slice the analysis so fine as to find subjective business purpose
when there is no objective economic substance.
45. The Treasury made a similar claim in the preamble to the partnership anti-abuse
regulations. According to the preamble, the regulations would obviate the need for case-
by-case judicial determinations of when anti-avoidance doctrines should apply. T.D. 8588,
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committee reports, the range of judicial interpretations may be narrowed
somewhat, but any difference is likely to be modest.
There is a significant risk of unintended consequences of a legislative
attempt to influence the judicial application of anti-avoidance doctrines.
As Martin Ginsburg has famously explained in his Law of Moses' Rod,
"[e]very stick crafted to beat on the head of a taxpayer will, sooner or
later, metamorphose into a large green snake and bite the Commissioner
on the hind part."'46 Sooner or later, taxpayers will win some cases under
the Treasury's proposed codification, which they would have lost without
it. For example, as discussed above, ACM seems to be a significant judi-
cial step away from requiring an absence of economic substance as a con-
dition of disallowing tax benefits from an abusive transaction. The
Treasury's proposal, however, clearly conditions application of the
GAAR on a transaction's lack of economic substance (as specially de-
fined). Because a stated purpose of the GAAR is to squelch judicial de-
velopments inconsistent with the statutory standard, the GAAR would
put a speedy halt to a process which might otherwise result in judicial
development of an anti-abuse rule (in the sense described by Alan
Gunn).
D. "AND WE REALLY MEAN IT!"
In addition to tidying up the common law anti-avoidance doctrines,
codification might serve to emphasize those doctrines in the minds of
courts and taxpayers. Many courts take a statute more seriously than a
doctrine embodied only in case law.47 Again, there is something to this
point, but not a great deal. Although Judge McKee exaggerated in his
dissent in ACM, when he claimed that existing common law doctrines
amount to nothing more than a "smell test,"' 48 it is certainly true that
courts inclined to apply existing anti-avoidance doctrines have great dis-
cretion to do so under current law. Conversely, courts that are disin-
clined to apply anti-avoidance doctrines would have great discretion not
to do so even under codification. 49 Cases in which the judge's mind is so
supra note 9, at 112. The claim is not quite so overstated in that context, because the
partnership regulations give the IRS discretion in deciding when the regulations apply,
thus narrowing the scope of judicial review. See Treas. Reg. § 1.701-2(b) (1995).
46. Martin Ginsburg, The National Office Mission, 27 TAX NOTES 99, 100 (1985).
47. See, e.g., Calvin H. Johnson, The Anti-Skunk Works Corporate Tax Shelter Act of
1999, 84 TAx NOTES 443, 446 (1999) (codification would "absolve the courts from accusa-
tions of judicial activism" when they apply anti-avoidance doctrines); Aprill, supra note 1,
at 19 (codification would "make the standard more salient" to judges); Bankman, supra
note 34, at 1793 (codification would "embolden those judges who would otherwise be
reluctant to rely on existing common law").
48. ACM, 187 F.3d, at 265. For two excellent articles responding to McKee, see Hari-
ton, supra note 17, and Trier, supra note 44.
49. Under the Treasury's proposal, courts will have considerable discretion in deter-
mining the reasonably expected pre-tax profit, in determining whether those profits were
"insignificant" relative to expected tax benefits, and in determining whether the tax bene-
fits at issue were "clearly contemplated" by Congress. 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra
note 4, at 124.
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evenly balanced that codification will tip the balance are not likely to be
numerous.
What about the effect of a GAAR on taxpayers' decisions whether to
enter into dubious shelter transactions? The hope is that responsible tax
practitioners would point to the GAAR in dissuading their clients from
shelter transactions, and that clients who would not sit still to read a wel-
ter of case law would take the time to read the statute (and would be
dissuaded). 50 As with the other justifications, there is something to this,
but not much. Clients in a mood not to be dissuaded will decide (with the
help of the shelter promoter) that their shelters are not within the scope
of the vague and general terms of the statute.
II. SO WHAT TO DO?
The preceding discussion was not an argument against a GAAR as a
weapon in the fight against corporate tax shelters; I am agnostic as to the
wisdom of that course. A codified anti-avoidance rule would be of margi-
nal benefit in some ways, and the expected benefit might or might not
outweigh the risk of unintended consequences. The key word, however,
is marginal. Any anti-tax shelter effort which is built around a GAAR is
doomed to fail. If corporate shelters are to be brought under control, it
will not be by a codification of anti-avoidance doctrines. This section dis-
cusses two possible approaches, which unlike a GAAR, offer some hope
of controlling shelters-a serious threat of individual criminal liability for
failure to comply with statutory tax shelter disclosure requirements, and a
schedular system for corporations analogous to the passive loss rules of
IRC § 469. There are serious problems with both approaches (mostly po-
litical with the former, mostly technical with the latter), and both may
turn out to be dead ends. Unlike a focus on a GAAR, however, they at
least offer some hope of success.
A. CRIMINAL PENALTIES FOR NON-DISCLOSURE
Even without a statutory GAAR, the IRS has been very successful
under existing law in challenging corporate tax shelters in court. 51 The
real corporate shelter problem is with the shelters which the IRS never
finds, and hence never challenges. A risk-neutral corporation would de-
cide to enter into a tax shelter transaction as long as the tax cost of not
entering the shelter is greater than the expected cost of entering the shel-
ter.52 Suppose the question is whether to do a shelter transaction, which
50. See Bankman, supra note 34, at 1788 (concluding clients are more likely to read
and understand a short statute than case law); Canellos, supra note 37, at 50 (finding that
codification could serve the purpose of "arming conscientious tax advisors with a weapon
to persuade clients to resist tax shelter promoters").
51. For successes, see ACM, 157 F.3d at 203; Saba, 78 T.C.M. at 684; Compaq Com-
puter Corp. v. Comm'r, 113 T.C. 214 (1999).
52. A corporation might, of course, be risk-averse, especially with respect to penalties.
As corporate tax departments are increasingly viewed as profit centers, however, risk aver-
sion appears to be fading away. See Bankman, supra note 34, at 1784.
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will eliminate $1 million of tax liability if it works. The cost of not doing
the shelter, of course, is simply $1 million. Disregarding transaction
Costs, 53 the expected cost of doing the shelter is $1 million tax liability
plus any applicable penalties (ordinarily the only relevant penalty would
be the twenty percent substantial understatement penalty of IRC § 6662),
discounted by the perceived chance that the shelter will not be detected
and successfully challenged by the IRS. Expressing this as a formula, the
taxpayer will enter into the shelter if $1 million > x ($1 million +
$200,000), with x representing the odds, as perceived by the taxpayer, that
the IRS will successfully challenge the shelter. With the current twenty
percent penalty, the shelter will be attractive to a risk-neutral taxpayer as
long as x is eighty-three percent or less. It would be unusual for x to be
anywhere near that level. For the shelter to be detected and disallowed,
(1) the IRS must audit the taxpayer, (2) the IRS agent must notice the
shelter, (3) the agent must decide to disallow tax shelter benefits, (4) the
disallowance must be upheld at higher levels of IRS internal review, and
(5) the IRS must prevail in court. For many corporations, the first factor
alone-the chances of not being audited-would be sufficient to place x
below the crucial level. In 1997, for example, only thirty-five percent of
corporations with assets of more than one-hundred million dollars were
audited. 54
The Administration has proposed increasing the substantial understate-
ment penalty for corporate tax shelters to forty percent, 55 but even with a
doubling of the penalty, shelters would still be attractive if x is seventy-
one percent or less.56 Assuming a twenty percent perceived chance of
detection and successful challenge, which is probably a reasonable esti-
mate for many corporate shelters (in the absence of disclosure), the pen-
alty would have to be more than 400% before the shelter would fail the
cost-benefit analysis of a risk-neutral corporation.57 There is serious
doubt whether even the proposed forty percent penalty is politically real-
istic; a 400% penalty is clearly out of the question.
All this suggests that efforts to increase x may prove more effective
than efforts to increase penalties in the struggle to deter corporations
from tax shelter transactions. If a taxpayer were required clearly to dis-
close the existence of a shelter to the IRS, then odds of detection and
challenge (more precisely, the perceived odds of detection and challenge,
which might be close to 100%) might be high enough to deter most cor-
porations, even with a penalty of only forty percent or even twenty per-
53. Major transaction costs would include fees to the shelter promoter, legal and ac-
counting fees, and the pre-tax loss (if any) inherent in the shelter transaction.
54. See WHnE PAPER, supra note 4, at 29 (citing IRS Annual Reports).
55. See 2001 REVENUE PROPOSALS, supra note 4, at 95.
56. The Treasury has also proposed a $100,000 penalty for a corporation's failure to
disclose a tax shelter. See id. at 122-23. Because this penalty would be a flat amount
(rather than a percentage of the underpayment), its effect on the critical level of x would
be small for larger shelters.
57. Other commentators have made basically the same point. See, e.g., Bankman,
supra note 34, at 1792; Johnson, supra note 47, at 452.
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cent. In fact, such a disclosure requirement already exists in the proposed
and temporary regulations recently promulgated under IRC § 6011.58
Under these regulations, a corporation, which has participated in a "re-
portable transaction" must attach a statement to its income tax return
identifying and thoroughly describing the transaction.59 Reportable
transactions are defined broadly enough that few large tax shelters should
escape the requirement.60
This does not mean, however, that corporations will now disclose all
significant shelters. Instead, corporations are now faced with three op-
tions for cost-benefit analysis: no shelter transaction, a disclosed shelter,
or an undisclosed shelter (in violation of the new regulations). No shelter
may be preferable to a disclosed shelter, but an undisclosed shelter may
be best of all-if an undisclosed shelter is likely to go undetected, and if
the penalties for nondisclosure are mild. Through no fault of the Trea-
sury or the IRS, the penalties for violation of the new regulations are very
weak. The preamble to the regulations warns, "[iln the event of an un-
derpayment attributable to a reportable transaction, a taxpayer's failure
to satisfy the disclosure requirements... may affect its exposure to penal-
ties under sections 6662 [twenty percent penalty for substantial under-
statements] and 6663 [seventy-five percent penalty for fraud] of the
Code. '61 The threat is not that the nondisclosure itself would be subject
to penalty, but merely that "the nondisclosure could indicate that the tax-
payer has not acted in 'good faith' with respect to the underpayment," so
as to be eligible for the "reasonable cause" penalty escape hatch of I.R.C.
§ 6664(c). 62 The idea that disclosure could entitle the taxpayer to a good
faith exception to the fraud penalty is silly; fraud and good faith are obvi-
ously incompatible, and the regulations interpreting I.R.C. § 6664(c) give
no indication the reasonable cause escape hatch could ever apply to the
fraud penalty. 63 In short, the only real risk of nondisclosure is exposure
to the twenty percent substantial understatement penalty in the case of
detection and successful challenge (an exposure which existed, inciden-
tally, even before the promulgation of the new regulations). The tooth-
58. See T.D. 8877, 2000-11 I.R.B. 747.
59. Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(c) (2000).
60. See Temp. Treas. Reg. § 1.6011-4T(b) (defining reportable transactions to include
both "listed transactions" specifically described by published IRS guidance, and other
transactions possessing at least two of six features typical of corporate tax shelters). Both
prongs of the definition are subject to a "projected tax effect" test. A listed transaction is
reportable only if it involves tax savings in excess of $1 million in a single year or $2 million
in two or more years. Other transactions are reportable only if the expected tax savings
are more than $5 million in a single year or more than $10 million in two or more years.
See id.
61. T.D. 8877, supra note 58, at 747. The preamble also notes that "when a taxpayer
verifies its return, which includes a declaration that the return is complete, a taxpayer af-
firms that it has accurately made all disclosures required by these temporary regulations."
Id. This may be a subtle threat of criminal prosecution in extreme cases, although this
degree of subtlety is likely to go unnoticed by many readers.
62. Id.
63. Treas. Reg. § 1.6664-4 (1991) (discussing the reasonable cause and good faith ex-
ception only in the context of I.R.C. § 6662).
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lessness of the new regulations is not the fault of Treasury or the IRS;
Congress conferred no authority to impose penalties for nondisclosure of
this information.
A disclosure requirement could be an effective tool in counteracting
corporate tax shelters, but only if violation of the requirement is not an
attractive option. Since violation of the requirement will be difficult for
the IRS to detect (for the same reasons that undisclosed shelters are diffi-
cult to detect), disregarding the disclosure requirement will generally be
an attractive option unless the penalty for nondisclosure is severe. As
noted above, an effective monetary penalty would have to be in the range
of several hundred percent of the tax involved, and that seems politically
out of the question. An alternative, which might be an effective deterrent
even when the odds of detection of nondisclosure are quite low, is a cred-
ible threat of criminal sanctions on the individual(s) responsible for pre-
paring the corporate tax return. There is a remote possibility that
egregious violations of the new disclosure regulations could be subject to
criminal prosecution even under existing I.R.C. § 7206 (relating to fraud
and false statements), 64 but the threat would be much more credible if
Congress were to enact a statute specifically criminalizing willful failures
to comply with the corporate tax shelter disclosure rules.65 At the same
time, Congress could specifically criminalize failure by tax shelter pro-
moters to comply with the registration and record-keeping requirements
of I.R.C. §§ 6111 and 6112.66
Just as there is no political support for a monetary penalty for nondis-
closure sufficient to serve as an effective deterrent, there may be no polit-
ical support for criminal penalties. In that case, however, the entire
approach of controlling shelters through disclosure requirements is hope-
less. If criminal sanctions are politically feasible, the major technical
problem will be constructing a definition of reportable transactions clear
enough to support criminal liability for failure to disclose. On first read-
ing, the new regulations appear to have achieved an impressive level of
clarity in describing reportable transactions, although that impression
awaits confirmation by experience. In any event, the level of precision
64. In fact, the preamble to the new regulations under I.R.C. § 6011 appears to contain
a veiled threat of prosecution under I.R.C. § 7206. See supra note 61 for a discussion. For
another IRS threat of criminal prosecution in the tax shelter context, see Notice 2000-44,
2000-36 I.R.B. 255 (warning that concealing the amount of capital gains and losses by net-
ting gains and losses from several transactions, and showing only the net amount of gain or
loss on the return, may constitute a criminal offense).
65. A Treasury proposal would require disclosure of shelter transactions, and would
make the officer signing the disclosure form "personally liable for misstatements on the
form, with heightened penalties for fraud or gross negligence." 2001 REVENUE PROPOS-
ALS, supra note 4, at 123. This seems to contemplate only civil penalties. More fundamen-
tally, it penalizes corporate officers only for bad disclosure, when the real problem is non-
disclosure.
66. Although I.R.C. §§ 6707 and 6708 already provide specific penalties for violation
of the tax shelter promoter provisions, the penalties are civil only.
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necessary to avoid unconstitutional vagueness is not particularly high, 67
especially if the criminal statute applies only to knowing violations of the
disclosure requirement.68
A danger of criminal sanctions for nondisclosure is that taxpayers will
over-disclose in response, thus swamping the IRS' ability to make use of
disclosures. If everything is disclosed, then nothing is disclosed. This is a
problem with any disclosure requirement, but the threat of criminal pen-
alties makes it worse. Over-disclosure which would otherwise be an in-
defensible gaming of the system will be viewed more sympathetically if
there is a plausible claim that it was done out of fear of prosecution. Per-
haps over-disclosure can be kept to manageable levels by a combination
of a very clear definition of reportable transactions and civil penalties for
frivolous over-disclosure, but the problem is real.
In sum, there are both political and technical reasons why criminalizing
non-disclosure may fail, but if it does fail then the entire deterrence ap-
proach to combating tax shelters-focused on the risk of detection and on
penalties-is probably doomed.
B. A SILVER BULLET?
The previous era of individual tax shelters was brought to a close not
by litigation under anti-avoidance doctrines, not by penalties and disclo-
sure requirements, and not by narrow legislation aimed at particularly
troubling shelter techniques. Rather, the silver bullet that killed individ-
ual shelters was the enactment in 1986 of the passive loss rules.69 The
passive loss rules apply a schedular (or "basketing") approach, under
which different types of activities are put in different tax baskets and
losses in one basket cannot be used to offset income in other baskets. 70
In particular, losses from businesses in which a taxpayer does not materi-
ally participate cannot be used to shelter labor income, nonbusiness in-
vestment income (such as interest and dividends), and active business
income.
The inevitable question is whether there is some analogue to the pas-
sive loss rules, which could kill corporate tax shelters as efficiently as
those rules killed individual shelters. In a recent published discussion, a
leading tax practitioner suggested that something similar to the passive
loss rules might be the only answer to the corporate shelter problem.71 In
response to that suggestion, a leading government tax official remarked
67. See, e.g., Nash v. United States, 229 U.S. 373, 377 (1913) (remarking that "the law
is full of instances where a man's fate depends on his estimating rightly, that is, as the jury
subsequently estimates it, some matter of degree").
68. See, e.g., Boyce Motor Lines v. United States, 342 U.S. 337 (1952) (holding that a
statute is not vague to a defendant who knows he is violating the statute).
69. I.R.C. § 469 (1986).
70. See generally Lawrence Zelenak, When Good Preferences Go Bad: A Critical
Analysis of the Anti-Tax Shelter Provisions of the Tax Reform Act of 1986, 67 TEXAS L.
REv. 499 (1989).
71. See Richard M. Lipton et al., Corporate Tax Shelters Roundtable, TAXEs, March
2000, at 141, 144 (comments of Richard M. Lipton). For a similar suggestion, see Lee A.
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that the Treasury had considered that approach, but had decided that it
was unworkable. The problem with the analogy to the passive loss rules,
he said, was that individual shelters were structurally so similar that a
one-size-fits-all solution was possible, but that corporate shelters "all in-
volve different areas of the code and they're different shapes and sizes so
we would love to find a silver bullet one size fits all but these things are
just too varied to try to get at."' 72 The Treasury White Paper expresses
the same conclusion in less colorful language. 73
In the end, the Treasury's conclusion that a schedular system will not
work for corporate shelters may be correct. In broad outline, it is simple
enough to sketch the difficulties with the approach. It might be possible
(although certainly it would not be easy) to define an active business bas-
ket and a portfolio basket for corporations, and to provide that losses in
the portfolio basket could not shelter income in the active business bas-
ket. It is unclear, however, how successful this approach might be. In
some cases, the income to be sheltered will itself be in the portfolio bas-
ket, and thus shelterable by a tax shelter loss in the portfolio basket.74 In
other cases, the income to be sheltered will be in the active business bas-
ket, but shelter promoters may be able to design a shelter which also goes
into the active basket.75 Despite these difficulties, the schedular ap-
proach seems worthy of further consideration. If (as seems likely) most
income to be sheltered is from active businesses, and if (as also seems
likely) active business shelters are much harder to design than portfolio
shelters, 76 then a schedular system would seriously impede shelter activ-
ity, even if it did not succeed in shutting down all shelters.
The analogy to the passive loss rules is so appealing, that it would be a
shame to give up on the schedular approach to corporate shelters without
Sheppard, Is There Constructive Thinking About Corporate Tax Shelters?, 83 TAx NoTEs
782, 784-85 (1999).
72. Lipton et al., supra note 71, at 144 (comments of Joseph Mikrut, U.S. Tax Legisla-
tive Counsel).
73. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 1 113. In striking contrast, Lee Sheppard rather
blithely concludes that designing an effective schedular system for corporations would be
simplicity itself: "The definition for portfolio holdings could be simple, straightforward,
and objective and could hook into existing provisions of the law." Sheppard, supra note
71, at 784. What is striking about both the WHITE PAPER and the Sheppard article are the
certainty with which they express their opposite conclusions, and the lack of significant
analysis in support of those conclusions.
74. See, e.g., Saba, 78 T.C.M. at 688-89 (some of the income at which the shelter was
aimed came from the sale of Brunswick's 36% interest in Nireco, a Japanese corporation);
Compaq, 113 T.C., at 215 (shelter was intended to offset capital gain from the sale of stock
of Conner Peripherals, a publicly traded corporation not affiliated with Compaq).
75. An individual cannot easily avoid the passive loss rules by generating active busi-
ness tax shelter losses, because only a substantial investment of the individual's time will
satisfy the material participation standard. See Treas. Reg. § 1.469-5T(a)(1) (1988) (mate-
rial participation generally requires more than 500 hours of the taxpayer's time during the
year). Other demands on an individual's time will usually make satisfying the material
participation standard impractical. A corporation, of course, is not similarly constrained in
its ability to conduct active businesses.
76. The greater difficulty comes largely from the likelihood that active business shel-
ters-unlike portfolio shelters-will involve unacceptable levels of non-tax risk.
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having made every effort to design a workable system. The White Paper
suggests that the Treasury gave the approach serious consideration before
abandoning it, but it describes the problems with the approach in only the
briefest and vaguest of terms.77 I would suggest that the Treasury issue a
full report on the topic, describing in detail what it perceives to be the
problems with the schedular approach, and soliciting assistance from
sympathetic practitioners and academics in overcoming those difficulties.
As bright and fertile as the minds of the Treasury undeniably are, once
the issue receives a full public airing it is possible-not likely, but possi-
ble-that someone in practice or the academy will devise a solution which
has eluded the Treasury. It seems worth a try.
III. CONCLUSION
I do not mean to oversell either criminal penalties for nondisclosure or
a corporate tax schedular system as the solution to the problem of corpo-
rate shelters. Each approach involves very serious difficulties, both polit-
ical and technical. Nevertheless, each has the potential to strike a
serious-perhaps even fatal-blow to the corporate tax shelter industry.
That is certainly more than can be said for codification of anti-avoidance
doctrines, toothless disclosure requirements, and tinkering with the civil
tax penalty structure.
77. WHITE PAPER, supra note 4, at 113.
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